... vote,¹

I realize that there is a serious debate among social scientists about the rationality of voting, but that is an orthogonal issue. Also, there is no cause for concern about IIA or related, generalized assumptions in the nested logit model, because I will focus on ``types'' of voters within whom there is no heterogeneity of preferences. There is thus no issue of assuming anything about cross-equation error terms.

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...tex2html_comment_mark²

Observant readers will note that this fraction is different from the linear regression coefficient one gets using OLS, even if the constant is constrained to be zero, because this coefficient is the ratio of average votes for candidate k to average total votes by county. This ratio will differ from the MLE estimate, depending on the distribution of county sizes.

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...tex2html_comment_mark³

This conjecture can really only be examined using simulation methods, and I can't spend too much more time on this!

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...tex2html_comment_mark⁴

For a discussion of the ``stronghold'' hypothesis, see http://www.econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/HowManyBadBuchananBallots.html as well as http://glue.umd.edu/ $\tilde{\,}$gelbach/whowon/stronghold.html.

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